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Programmes: Lessons from DPEP and SSA  
Rashmi Sharma 
The District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) 
and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) that followed 
it, have been critical programmes for elementary 
education in India. DPEP aimed at making primary 
education universal, while the goal of SSA was 
to make elementary education universal. Both 
sought to reduce gender and social inequities in 
education and improve learning levels. As these 
programmes progressed, they were pivotal not 
only in implementing policy, but also in creating it 
and changing institutional structure. In DPEP and 
SSA, new schools and supporting institutions were 
set up, new policies regarding teachers evolved, 
and pedagogic practices, i.e. textbooks, teaching 
methodology, student evaluation etc. were 
impacted. 
As an Indian Administrative Service officer, I was 
happy to work in the DPEP and SSA, because I 
was keenly interested in elementary education. 
But surprisingly, this experience led me back to 
a renewed interest in my core work: the working 
of government. As I collaborated with colleagues 
within and outside the government on pedagogic 
issues such as textbook writing, teacher training, 
student evaluation etc., various non-pedagogic 
‘events’ took place, which eclipsed concerns about 
teaching and learning, and swept along our efforts 
in unexpected directions. It became clear to me that 
the quality of elementary education was at least as 
dependent on how the government worked, as it 
was on the curriculum, the quality of textbooks and 
teacher training and that government reforms were 
a necessary condition for the reform of education. 
DPEP was launched in 1994, after the economic 
reforms of 1991. The economic reforms were 
taken up in the context of a foreign exchange crisis, 
for which the government sought an emergency 
loan from the Indian Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF 
conditions required not only that the economy be 
liberalised, i.e., licenses and quotas for industries 
be disbanded and tariff barriers be lowered, but 
also that government expenditure be controlled. 
This meant a financial squeeze on the social sector, 
including elementary education. There were fears 
among policy makers that such budgetary cut-backs 
would hurt the poorest sections of society and, in 
education, stall the universalisation of elementary 
education, which was mandated in the directive 
principles of the Indian Constitution. Moreover, 
at this time, India had become signatory to 
several international agreements to make primary 
education universal. Consequently, the government 
decided to seek financial assistance from external 
funding agencies such as the European Union, the 
World Bank etc for primary education, which came 
in the form of an externally assisted programme for 
making primary education universal in backward 
districts, i.e. DPEP. 
DPEP differed from the government programmes 
of that time in several ways. To begin with, it was 
implemented through a project structure, rather 
than the departmental machinery. Project offices 
to manage the programme were set up at state 
and district level, separate from the offices of 
the government departments. This decision was 
driven by two factors. The practical reason was 
that, as DPEP was funded by various external 
agencies, a separate project structure enabled 
better tracking of expenditures and monitoring 
of the project by the funding agencies. But in a 
more long-term sense, the more important reason 
was a belief that the regular government offices 
and institutions were simply not capable of the 
type of developmental work envisaged in DPEP. 
Proponents of the project approach argued that the 
administrative structures of education were totally 
caught up in routine activities such as disbursing 
salaries, organising examinations, lackadaisical 
school inspections etc., and academic institutions 
lacked real expertise and willingness to innovate. 
In contrast, making good quality primary education 
universal required community mobilisation to get 
out -of -school children into school, with a special 
focus on girls, scheduled caste and scheduled tribe 
children and the disabled and an interesting and 
attractive classroom. 
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My own first exposure to DPEP as Director, State 
Council for Educational Research and Training 
(SCERT) in Madhya Pradesh showed, all too clearly, 
that these were very real problems of our existing 
institutions. SCERT was given the task of making 
new textbooks that promote activity-based learning 
and teacher training. In actual fact, SCERT had no 
one who could guide this process. SCERT routinely 
produced slipshod textbooks, which were dull, not 
based on any thought-out pedagogic strategy, and 
even full of printing errors! To make good quality, 
activity-based textbooks, intensive collaboration 
with NGOs and experts from outside government 
became necessary. And the SCERT faculty, rather 
than leading the reform, had to be coaxed to 
participate and not obstruct the new pedagogic 
practices. While some of the faculty joined in and 
worked hard, others continued to drag their feet. 
This experience showed clearly that the state 
government had paid no attention to developing 
the SCERT as an institute of excellence. The people 
posted to SCERT were usually college teachers and 
were there not because they were interested in 
school education or had some special expertise, 
but because they wanted to stay in Bhopal and 
were in a position to manipulate their posting. 
Some were disinterested in work of any kind, some 
were happy to work as they always had, producing 
indifferent textbooks and teacher training modules 
and a few who were work oriented, lacked 
exposure and encouragement. Now, when the 
government attempted to improve the quality of 
primary education, its institute was of little help. 
This problem of human resources was visible not 
just in SCERT, but all through the system. The 
administrative offices lacked trained educational 
administrators, and experts in gender, community 
mobilisation, education of differently abled children 
etc. Making primary education universal required a 
radically different institutional support structure. 
Given this situation, two approaches were possible. 
One, the government could have improved the 
existing institutions. Two, setting up a separate 
project structure, with better expertise and modes 
of working. The first possibility was never even 
seriously considered. The political need, as well as 
pressure from funding agencies was to act quickly, 
building new schools, changing text books, training 
teachers, etc. Transforming the system would 
have taken time. Moreover, it was difficult to do: it 
meant getting the right people in the right places. 
In the regular structure, favourites were posted in 
good positions, with little attention to merit, and 
changing this practice meant upsetting existing 
power equations. It also meant working in a more 
thinking and democratic manner, rather than the 
command -and -control style, which also affected 
those in power. Given these difficulties, DPEP was 
implemented through a project structure. 
The project strategy appeared to work to a degree. 
Several activities, ie new schools, vastly improved 
textbooks, large-scale teacher training, community 
mobilisation, various types of strategies to enrol 
out of school children etc. were taken up. 
Why did this happen? Why was the new project 
structure more vibrant than the old government 
structures? Notably, the DPEP staff included 
experts on gender, children from deprived groups, 
differently -abled children, community mobilisation 
etc., unlike the regular government offices and 
institutions, which were staffed with teachers who 
had been promoted, but never retrained to address 
their new tasks. In DPEP, efforts were made to 
recruit the best possible people in contrast to the 
patronage-based transfer and posting practices 
that characterised the regular system. In other 
words, human resource management in DPEP took 
into account the merit and the expertise needed, 
rather than patronage, as the criteria for positioning 
people. This was supported further by constant 
engagement with NGOs and resource persons, so 
that expertise from outside the government was 
also harnessed. 
However, even as DPEP adopted new ways of 
working, no attempts were made to bring about 
similar changes in the regular departmental 
structure. In fact, the departmental structure was 
weakened further, as it was reduced to routine 
work, such as disbursing salaries and conducting 
examinations. People working in the regular 
departmental offices were not trained or exposed 
to new ideas and were de-motivated as they felt 
(and were) excluded from new initiatives. This 
exclusion was visible from the ground to the 
national level. Many of them became critical of 
DPEP initiatives and created difficulties for the 
project. More important, an opportunity to bring 
about long-term changes in the existing system 
was lost. What may have happened if the expertise 
hired in the project structure had been made part 
of the regular departmental structure, merit-based 
transfers and postings made mandatory and the 
whole departmental structure retrained in new 
ways, remains a hypothetical question. 
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When SSA replaced DPEP in 2000, there were some 
important shifts. First, as SSA was launched in 2000, 
the Indian economy had begun to grow rapidly 
and government revenues increased substantially. 
This meant that the government could spend 
substantially more funds on the social sector. 
Consequently, SSA was not externally funded, but 
was funded by the Central Government, with state 
governments providing a small share. Over the 
years, the funds available for SSA and, through it, 
investment in elementary education, increased 
exponentially. Yet today, though several new 
schools have been set up, the school infrastructure 
has improved vastly, and enrolment in elementary 
education is near universal, children’s learning 
levels remain abysmal, and there is a continuous 
migration of wealthier children to private schools. 
In spite of huge investments, a well-functioning 
elementary education system remains out of reach. 
The reasons for this lie in the persisting fault lines 
government functioning that DPEP took short-term 
measures to counter but failed to address for the 
longer term. In SSA, the defences that DPEP had 
tried to create against the institutional malaise 
were undone. 
SSA, as a national programme, could have done 
away with the project structure. However, though 
the proponents of the programme criticised the 
project structure of DPEP, it was retained in SSA. 
The reason for this was simply that the pros and 
cons and possibilities were not discussed in-depth. 
In fact, scant attention was paid to the lessons, 
positive and negative, from DPEP. This happened 
because in government, policies and programmes 
are formulated in a highly individualistic manner. 
The extent and depth to which past experiences are 
analysed and lessons learned are highly variable. As 
SSA was formulated, there was little exploration of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the DPEP project 
structures. In the end, they simply became the SSA 
structures and, as SSA moved beyond the DPEP 
districts, similar structures were set up in new 
districts. Again, there was no attempt to address 
long term institutional problems. 
At the same time, many of the positive practices 
that had made DPEP structures effective were 
abandoned. As SSA was a domestically funded 
programme and not an externally funded one, 
manpower recruitment and placement processes 
were more aligned to the existing practices 
within government. Consequently, over time, the 
merit-based recruitment and posting that had 
characterised DPEP were replaced by patronage-
based postings. Also, compared to DPEP, officials in 
SSA engaged far less with experts from outside the 
system, so that the flow of new ideas and practices 
declined too. As in the case of other government 
programmes, the focus shifted to creation of 
infrastructure. Consequently, much of the vibrancy 
that had characterised DPEP was lost. 
In fact, DPEP and SSA contributed significantly to 
reducing the quality of teachers. An important 
development that took place with DPEP was that 
‘para’ teachers, contractual employees, who 
were poorly paid, began to be appointed. This 
happened because many states needed large 
numbers of additional teachers to make primary 
education universal, but the finances of most state 
governments were in poor shape. As the pressure 
to make primary education universal grew, states 
attempted to bring down the cost of teachers so 
that they could hire more of them and began to 
appoint para- teachers. In Madhya Pradesh, regular 
teachers were declared a ‘dying cadre’ and were 
replaced by para -teachers as they retired. The 
‘Education Guarantee Scheme’ of Madhya Pradesh 
promoted the concept of poorly paid, contractual 
community teachers as desirable and not just a 
response to strained finances and was admired by 
many. Not all states embraced the para- teachers as 
enthusiastically as Madhya Pradesh, but nearly all 
hired some para- teachers. 
The appointment of para- teachers was a highly 
contested issue. Those who favoured the idea 
argued that the regular teachers became smug 
because they were permanent, were often absent, 
did not teach with any commitment and there was 
no need to pay them good salaries. A contractual, 
low paid teacher from the community was far 
more likely to be committed to the school. Those 
who were against para -teachers argued that 
teachers needed to be made more, and not less, 
professional. Hiring poorly paid, ill qualified para 
-teachers was a disservice to the poor children who 
attended government schools. Again, this question 
was rarely debated rationally. For instance, little 
attention was given to the fact that politicisation 
of teachers, patronage in postings, and lack of 
recognition of good work, rather than salary and 
permanence, may be the important issues. Again, 
policies were often simply changed overnight, with 
little analysis and reflection. 
As SSA was launched, it tacitly supported para- 
teachers by providing payment for their salaries, 
and the number of para- teachers grew rapidly, 
in spite of the fact that the financial constraints 
that had propelled the appointment of para- 
teachers no longer existed. But, over time, para 
teachers formed unions and agitated for secure 
employment and better wages. Subsequently, state 
governments had to make several concessions, 
raising the salaries of para -teachers and making 
tenures more secure. This meant adopting the 
worst of both worlds: poorly qualified people 
were hired as teachers when low-paid, contractual 
jobs were advertised. But their salaries had to be 
increased, not on the basis of performance, but 
on the success of their agitations. Many para- 
teachers also became semi-permanent, with the 
consequence that the whole idea of removing a 
teacher because of poor performance became 
meaningless. In addition, the policies regarding 
teachers changed continuously and school system 
now functioned with a large number of dissatisfied, 
and often agitating, teachers. 
Because the institutions remained fundamentally 
unreformed, there were setbacks in other areas 
too. For example, DPEP had promoted context- 
specific, decentralised planning and each year, 
district level plans were prepared with the goal 
of making primary education universal. The DPEP 
programme guidelines were very sparse, with 
only some ‘do’s and don’ts’, as each district was 
expected to formulate its own strategies in the 
context of its own problems. For example, to enrol 
out -of -school children, the strategy could be to 
mobilise and sensitise the community, or start an 
alternative education centre, or initiate a bridge 
course so that children could join formal schools, 
etc. This was unlike the usual government schemes, 
where strategies were pre-decided. For example, 
the pre-DPEP scheme for Non-Formal Education 
(NFE) stipulated a single strategy to enrol out- of 
-school children, i.e. starting non- formal education 
centres with fixed costs. It did take into account 
that, in some cases, mobilising the community to 
send children to schools, or providing childcare to 
free older siblings to attend schools might be better 
strategies. 
As district plans were prepared every year in DPEP, 
they were discussed and analysed in some depth 
at all levels. Several new strategies to enrol out 
-of -school children emerged. However, from the 
very beginning, the tendency was to take decisions 
at the state level, so that all the district plans of a 
particular state looked alike. This happened for two 
reasons. One there was the lack of capacity at the 
district level. The manpower at the district offices 
was limited. Moreover, district officials were not 
used to planning and often did not make very good 
plans. In such cases, state officials tended to step 
in. Second, this was how government departments 
usually functioned: state officials directing district 
officials. Consequently, state as well as district level 
officials were comfortable in these roles. However, 
there was constant pressure in the project to make 
decentralised plans, and this led to at least some 
context-based planning and strategising.
SSA retained decentralised district level planning 
and in fact sought to promote village level planning. 
But in practice, with SSA, planning became even 
more top-driven. To begin with, SSA guidelines 
were very different from DPEP guidelines. As 
stated above, DPEP guidelines did not indicate 
specific activities or prescribe fixed unit costs, 
which allowed for significant flexibility. However, 
SSA guidelines contained both these, as this 
was the usual government practice, and finance 
departments insisted on it. SSA was more flexible 
than the usual government programmes, in the 
sense that it allowed a wider range of activities, and 
also allowed districts to choose from among these 
activities. However, as the activities and unit costs 
were pre-defined, district plans simply repeated 
these activities and provided numbers. With 
greater control of the regular government system 
on SSA, the top-down practices were strengthened 
further. 
Similarly, serious pedagogic reforms attempted 
in DPEP suffered too. In several states, in DPEP, 
new, activity-based textbooks were prepared. 
But this was an uphill struggle. Sometimes, the 
new textbooks attracted a great deal of criticism, 
as they introduced new and unfamiliar ways of 
learning. When teachers were trained for activity-
based learning, they too had difficulty in grasping 
concepts. Since the capacities of SCERT faculty 
and education departments had not been built 
adequately, many officials and teacher educators 
remained hostile to these changes. Often, 
when governments or bureaucrats in-charge 
changed, the new textbooks were abandoned. 
With SSA, the focus on quality of education and 
pedagogy diminished further as posts were filled 
increasingly with the regular administrators and 
teacher educators, and consultation with experts 
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outside government declined. Teacher training 
programmes, once taken up with a great deal of 
care and commitment, often became routine, 
and even the source of corruption. In the end, 
establishing new schools, creating infrastructure, 
hiring new teachers and providing free textbooks, 
uniforms etc. to students became the focus of 
SSA. These were important, but as the classroom 
processes did not improve, a high-quality school 
system remained out of grasp. 
The most important lesson from DPEP and SSA, 
to my mind, is about the working of government. 
There are deep problems related to human 
resources and working styles in government. 
The structure of manpower itself is problematic. 
Expertise that is needed in many areas is lacking. 
Further, the management of existing human 
resources is not based on merit. An official may be 
recruited on merit, but during the course of her 
career, for postings and even promotions, is more 
likely to do well by nurturing powerful godfathers 
than doing her job well. This promotes a lack of 
commitment to work, as the existing incentive 
structure simply does not promote good work. 
The processes of working, based on hierarchy and 
centralisation, block strategies suited to the needs 
from the ground from emerging. Thinking through 
and deliberation are optional, even at the top-most 
levels of government. As a result, poorly thought 
-out programmes and policies go unchecked, 
especially if they provide political benefits. Even the 
better formulated programmes are laid low as they 
are implemented through institutional structures 
that lack technical capacity and function in a rigid 
and hierarchical manner. 
These characteristics impact every government 
initiative. All programmes are transformed and 
moulded in this pattern. DPEP attempted to bypass 
these problems by creating project structures, but 
failed to address existing institutional fault lines, 
and possibly deepened them. SSA carried them 
along, undoing the project gains of DPEP. 
The lesson is clear. The increasing government 
revenues today have made good quality elementary 
education a very real possibility. But the manner 
in which government works is a major constraint. 
Unless there is deep and real institutional reform, 
success in creating a really high-quality school 
system will remain elusive. 
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